• USA-2013

    For contributions to provable security methods supporting high-quality, cost-effective cryptography.

  • USA-2009

    For their development of the field of Practice-Oriented Provable-Security and its widespread impact on the theory and practice of cryptography and security. Historically, cryptographic schemes used in practice were designed in ad hoc ways and subject to failure. Practice-Oriented, Provable-Security (POPS), developed by Bellare and Rogaway in a series of papers in the 1990s, changed this, giving us the means to create high-assurance practical cryptography, meaning schemes that were backed by the theoretical guarantee of provable security while meeting practical needs and expectations. Today, POPS-based schemes are cornerstones of Internet security, implemented in most communication security protocols and software - these schemes are used every time someone makes a credit card-based Internet purchase. Meanwhile, the models, techniques and approaches that Bellare and Rogaway introduced, including the random oracle model, have become the foundation of a new subfield of cryptography, inspiring a great amount of follow-on work. Their papers are amongst the most cited in cryptography and their work is discussed in dozens of textbooks. Bellare and Rogaway changed the perception of theory in practice. Prior to their work, practitioners ignored theory or were even antagonistic to it. Today, they not only choose to implement and standardize proven-secure schemes, but make provable security a requirement in some of their calls for algorithms. That this requirement can be met owes much to Bellare and Rogaway's work.

Computer security focusing on authentication, encryption, and electronic payment standards that have helped secure transactions over the Internet and advance e-commerce standards. Professor Bellare's research interests fall into two categories: Cryptography and computer security; and Complexity theory. With the former he is concerned with practice oriented provable security; secure protocols; authentication; MACs; key distribution; signatures; encryption; zero-knowledge; implementations. And with the latter, his focus is on interactive and probabilistically checkable proofs; applications of these to obtaining non-approximability results for optimization problems; complexity of zero-knowledge; randomness in protocols and algorithms; computational learning theory. Bellare is co-developer of the HMAC authentication algorithm, which has emerged as a standard, being adopted by the IETF IPSEC Internet Standard, ANSI X.9 keyed hash standard, and also used numerous products including BSAFE (RSA Data Security Corp.), SSL (3.0 and 3.1), S-HTTP, NetBSD, and CDSA from Hewlett-Packard Company. He is also co-developer of the OAEP encryption algorithm which is included in the IEEE P1363 draft standard and the RSA PKCS #1 v2.0 standard and co-developer of iKP, a family of electronic payment protocols that lead to MasterCard and Visa's SET. Capsule Bio: Mihir Bellare came to the Jacobs School in 1995, where he runs the Cryptography Group along with professors Bennet Yee, Russell Impagliazzo, and Daniele Micciancio. Before coming to UCSD, he was a research staff member at the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technlogy in 1991, and his B.S. in mathematics from the California Institute of Technology. Bellare is a recipient of a David and Lucille Packard Foundation Fellowship in Science and Engineering, and an NSF CAREER Award in 1996.