Signaling through Bayesian persuasion

This paper examines the conditions under which separating outcomes occur in informed persuasion, that is, in Bayesian persuasion settings in which the sender is privately informed about the payoff-relevant state prior to commiting to an experiment. We consider a setting with finite payoff-relevant states and sender payoffs that are continuous and monotonic in the receiver’s posterior beliefs. The paper finds that if full disclosure of the payoff-relevant state reduces the sender’s expected payoff under any common prior (i.e., if the sender’s payoff function is outer concave), then single-crossing properties arise such that the high sender type can separate from the low type by choosing more informative experiments. This single-crossing condition leads to the selection of “least costly” separating equilibria by the D1 criterion, i.e., the sender’s choice of experiment signals his type. Further, separating equilibria are characterized by simple constrained maximization problems.