Defense and Attack Strategy Optimization for Reliability Systems with Virtual Components and Active Redundancy with a Game Theory Approach

Abstract Today, one of the most basic strategies for a government's survival is to defend sensitive places and resources, and to achieve this goal, strategic and efficient approaches are required. The goal of this research is to determine the best way to defend sensitive systems in which the defender tries to minimize the damage caused by the attacker while taking into account budget constraints and the space needed for defense equipment, and the attack tries to maximize the defender's injury. In this case, the defense creates a number of artificial targets in order to deceive the attacker, all while attempting to decrease the risk of damaging sensitive systems by not attacking them definitively. The goal's economic, human, and symbolic worth must be considered by both the defender and the attacker. The defender attempts to minimize projected harm and defense costs. The attacker aims to do as much damage as possible while keeping the attack's cost low. The attacker will "maybe" identify the targets because they are unable to identify the virtual targets. For the first time, a program model was developed that considers the possibilities for identifying virtual targets, reliability structures with mixed strategies (active and cold standby), non-homogeneous components in parallel series systems, and the game theory approach to finding equilibrium. A nonlinear layout is provided to optimize defense subsystems. The results are modeled and the results are evaluated in this research.