Illegal Wildlife Trade Networks: Finding Creative Opportunities for Conservation Intervention in Challenging Circumstances

The challenges faced by small organizations confronting illegal wildlife trade (IWT) networks can be large and frightening. In a context of high corruption, political instability and social upheaval, obtaining information about actor identities, connections and trade flows may come with risks to personal security. Yet it is precisely in these contexts that illegal wildlife trade may flourish, piggybacking on trade in other contraband items. In our recent work, we examined the hypothesis that such ‘parallel’ trafficking would dominate trade in a threatened, Neotropical finch, the Red Siskin (RS, Spinus cucullatus) in Venezuela (Sánchez-Mercado et al., 2019). Venezuela’s economic situation has experienced historic declines since 2014: by 2017, ~ 87% of the population lived in poverty, and from 2013 – 2018, GDP fell over 45% (España & Ponce, 2017). We expected the lure of ‘hard’ foreign currency, combined with widespread lawlessness, to drive IWT in this bird, in parallel with other illicit items. In spite of these conditions, although we did find an active and complex RS trade network, we found little evidence for parallel trade, and instead found a network reliant on specialized logistical capacity for transport and enforcement evasion, as well as intermediaries with specialized skills. While this finding of an active network was not good news, the network structure we found presents unexpected opportunities for small organizations up against this trade challenge, particularly in a South American context. We are grateful to Farine (2020), Tsang (2020) and Kahler (2020) for their generous and valuable insights about our study, and their careful note of caveats and recommendations for future work. For example, we agree that finding no evidence for parallel trade does not mean such trade does not exist. As Kahler (2020) and Tsang (2020) note, detection of parallel trade is not simple, though our failure to find evidence of it is likely due less to under reporting by interview subjects (who freely shared information about contacts), than to insufficient sampling effort, particularly among potential international colluders and intermediaries. However, parallel trafficking is just one way that an IWT network may operate, with its organized pyramidal structure, and fluxes dominated by monopolistic or power figures, as in the case of rhino, ivory, or tiger products. The structure of the Neotropical parrot trade network presents another such alternative (Pires, Schneider, & Herrera, 2016). Similar to their findings, we found little formal organization between or among actors. This modus operandi, although not exclusive to South American countries, may be driven by their general lack of environmental law enforcement: ordinary individuals may participate in IWT, with low risk and without need for organized crime groups. Thus, our lack of detection of parallel trade may reflect reality, and not just sampling bias. The potential reality of a significant ‘specialized’ rather than parallel trade in RS is not only less frightening, it also opens an opportunity for small organizations to impact the IWT challenge. Although some breeders emerged as key modulators of RS network fluxes, we found no significant bottlenecks. This implies that the network could circulate not only birds, but also targeted information, focused on reducing the use of wild-caught RS (Red Siskin Initiative, 2019). Understanding why key actors may prefer wild-caught vs captive-bred RS will be paramount for designing such information to circulate. Approaches from conservation psychology, such as the Theory of Planned Behavior, could be used to test hypotheses about behavioral factors (e.g. attitudes, social norms, perceived control) driving RS uses (Veríssimo et al., 2020). For example, wild RS use may be driven by ignorance of benign alternatives, such as captive-bred birds (the ‘ignorance’ hypothesis), or by an insufficient supply of captive-bred substitutes to meet demand (the ‘availability’ hypothesis). On the other hand, captive breeding may pose challenges that result in expensive captive-bred specimens (the ‘costs’ hypothesis). Finally, overexploitation of wild birds may be driven by a belief that regularly ‘refreshing’ flocks with wild-caught birds maintains genetic variability (the ‘refreshment’ hypothesis). Evaluating these hypotheses provides focus for future behavior change campaigns. If attitudes about genetic ‘refreshment’ explain significant variation in intention to use wild-caught individuals, for example, then disseminating information about experiences using captive-bred birds successfully may be appropriate, especially if combined with workshops to improve local breeding skills. Alternatively, if the ‘costs’ hypothesis has greater support, interventions aimed at reducing costs may be more effective. However, while small organizations can be successful in mitigating IWT network impacts using the above-described tools in criminology, psychology and sociology, network intervention will also require: (1) international and inter-institutional collaboration, and (2) efficient and comprehensive tools to monitor intervention impact. For example, the newly formed Asian Songbird Trade Specialist Group of the IUCN/SSC creates synergies of scale by bringing together a range of experts from different sectors to find creative approaches to reverse the growing threat to songbirds that trade presents. These include transportation sector engagement, environmental and enforcement interagency collaboration, consumer behavior and demand reduction, financial investigation and asset recovery, community engagement and emerging technologies for monitoring (tracking devices, forensic technology, social media data mining, etc; IUCN, 2020). Such cooperation contrasts with the presently weak links among most South American conservation organizations confronting IWT. For example, the first conference focused on wildlife trafficking in the Americas was organized just last year (CITES, 2019). In Venezuela, not a single international environmental NGO presently operates, and although some international funding supports research and action, Venezuelan NGOs operate largely in isolation, without backing from national environmental and enforcement authorities. This situation will likely need to shift for large changes to occur. In the meantime, in the context of specialized trade, small organizations have a way forward. In addition to understanding driving factors and implementing interventions, they may employ pioneering approaches to evaluation, in order to improve efficacy. We agree with Farine (2020) that analytical tools like stochastic actor-based models could be used to assess changes in trade network dynamics in response to conservation interventions. In the case of RS, for example, it will be possible to assess whether breeders adjust their use of wild-caught RS in concert with behavior changes observed in their direct network connections. Such approaches, when combined with efforts at improved international and inter-agency collaboration, present promising opportunities for mitigating the threat of illegal wildlife trade.