Markov Α-Potential Games: Equilibrium Approximation and Regret Analysis.
CoRR(2023)
摘要
This paper proposes a new framework of Markov $\alpha$-potential games to study Markov games. In this new framework, Markov games are shown to be Markov $\alpha$-potential games, and the existence of an associated $\alpha$-potential function is established. Any optimizer of an $\alpha$-potential function is shown to be an $\alpha$-stationary NE. Two important classes of practically significant Markov games, Markov congestion games and the perturbed Markov team games, are studied via this framework of Markov $\alpha$-potential games, with explicit characterization of an upper bound for $\alpha$ and its relation to game parameters. Additionally, a semi-infinite linear programming based formulation is presented to obtain an upper bound for $\alpha$ for any Markov game. Furthermore, two equilibrium approximation algorithms, namely the projected gradient-ascent algorithm and the sequential maximum improvement algorithm, are presented along with their Nash regret analysis, and corroborated by numerical experiments.
更多查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
![](https://originalfileserver.aminer.cn/sys/aminer/pubs/mrt_preview.jpeg)
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要