On David Coen, Alexander Katsaitis and Matia Vannoni's Business Lobbying in the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2021

Correspondence: gkwilson@bu.edu The publication of Coen, Katsaitis and Vannoni’s masterful study, Business Lobbying in the European Community invites reflection on how the study of business and politics has evolved. In particular, their study invites reflections on the institutionalization of business–government relations. Some 50 years ago, a politically diverse group of social scientists attracted considerable attention by arguing that business enjoyed such a structurally privileged position that its power and influence extended far beyond that what could be achieved through the normal processes of interest group politics. Business, in effect, did not need to mobilize and lobby. Lindblom, previously thought of a more conservative political scientist, shocked many by arguing that its control over investment decisions meant that business would prevail almost without trying. Politicians did not need to be pressured cajoled or bribed into giving business what it wanted because they would realize that otherwise investment, jobs and prosperity would be lost to places whose government was more accommodating (Lindblom, 1977). Peterson in effect applied this argument to American cities whose mayors needed to work to attract investment from business (and wealthier citizens), on the one hand, and to avoid adopting programs that would attract or retain poorer citizens on the other hand. Peterson (1981), Lukes (1974) and Crenson (1971) argued that business enjoyed a hegemony so strong that either issues business opposed were kept off the political agenda or were not even fully articulated because of the ideological dominance of pro-business attitudes.