"Barrier" Factors in the Framework of the Struggle of the Moscow Authorities with the Revolutionary Movement in 1905

The study reveals the question of the factors that prevented effective opposition to the revolutionary movement in Moscow in 1905 before the start of the armed uprising. The methodological set of tools used in the survey includes structural, diachronic and synchronous analysis. The source base of the work was formed by attracting unpublished archival documents from the funds of the Department for the Protection of Public Security and Order in Moscow under the Moscow mayor and the Police Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Empire, as well as a wide range of sources of personal origin. The results of the conducted research allow us to conclude that the Moscow authorities failed to fully realize the potential of the methods of combating the revolution available to them due to the presence of a number of circumstances, both objective and subjective. The police apparatus of Moscow and the military units stationed in the city and its environs were too few in number to solve the tasks assigned to them. Effective communication was not established between law enforcement and other law enforcement agencies, as a result of which their actions were poorly coordinated and often had an uncoordinated character. The Moscow leadership, represented by the governor-general and the mayor, was disoriented by the lack of clear and unambiguous instructions regarding the implementation of domestic policy after the publication of the manifesto on October 17. As a result, officials tried to delegate responsibility whenever possible and refrained from decisive action, showing high passivity. The importance of the exchange of information between departments and within them was leveled by the low speed of processing even the most important messages: the latter often reached the addressee with a colossal delay. Attempts to interact with loyalists also did not bring the expected result. The authorities cooperated with public organizations that did not have real support among the broad masses, and at the same time they did not take measures to prevent representatives of criminals and marginalized elements from being involved in the street activity of the monarchists. The consequence of this was an increase in the number of episodes of violence, which stimulated both the radicalization of the revolutionary movement and an increase in public fears about the outbreak of pogroms and riots. At the same time, some of the leaders of monarchist structures often poorly coordinated their actions with the Moscow authorities, and grassroots activists even spread various destructive rumors. A natural consequence of a combination of various factors that reduced the effectiveness of opposition to the revolutionary movement on the part of the authorities was the escalation of revolutionary violence, which resulted in the events of the armed uprising in December 1905.