Geostrategic competition and the balance between state and society: theory and historical evidence from the rivalry between Aragon and Genoa, 1358-1497

Heightened geostrategic competition enhances the strategic value to central powers of controlling peripheral territories. How does increased strategic value affects the balance between state and society? We consider the historical case of the relationship of the Mediterranean islands of Corsica and Sardinia to Genoa and Aragon in the late medieval period. Strategic competition between Genoa and Aragon had opposing effects on the two islands; strengthening society on Corsica while strengthening the feudal state on Sardinia. We develop a novel four-player game between two competing regional powers, the local elite, and the local society. We show how an increased strategic value of controlling a territory can both strengthen or weaken its society depending on society’s ability to insurrect. We propose possible extensions and further applications of our model to understand contemporary superpower competition.