Stock liquidity, empire building, and valuation
JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE(2021)
摘要
We conjecture that high stock liquidity negatively affects firm valuation by inducing inefficient investment. Using takeovers of public targets to study the empire-building motive, we find that a liquid firm is more likely than an illiquid firm to acquire a public firm. Such a takeover by a bidder with higher stock liquidity destroys bidder value to a larger degree. These patterns occur in both stock and cash acquisitions and hold after we use decimalization of tick size as a quasiexogenous shock to stock liquidity. Finally, we show that financial constraints and corporate governance play important roles in the effects of stock liquidity on empire building in mergers and acquisitions.
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关键词
Stock liquidity,Empire building,Mergers and acquisitions
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