New Technology Adoption in a Cournot Oligopoly with Spillovers

In a two-stage Cournot oligopoly where a subset of firms first make a choice between two alternative production technologies independently and then all firms compete in quantity, the effect of information spillovers is analyzed when the outcome of R&D is uncertain. It is shown that the range of parameter values that support heterogeneous firms in equilibrium will diminish as information spillovers become larger. Particularly, when the spillover effect is so strong that the investment by one firm is beneficial to its R&D active rivals, all active firms will choose the same technology. A similar result can be derived from a socially desirable point of view except that the cut-off magnitude of spillovers is different. By introducing a positive success probability to characterize the uncertainty of the R&D outcome, it is found that when information spillovers are not too small, there will be underinvestment in equilibrium relative to the social optimum.