Hit And Run Or Sit And Wait? Contestability Revisited In A Price-Comparison Site-Mediated Market

The price-comparison site, with its (near-)zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to approximate the "almost perfectly contestable market" envisaged by the contestability theorists where "hit-and-run" entry was conjectured to constrain sellers to zero-profit outcomes. We investigate hit and run using a unique unbalanced panel of 295 digital-camera markets mediated by NexTag.com. We find, however, in line with Farrell (1986a)'s prediction, a bifurcation of strategies with low reputation/smaller participants favouring a "hit-and-run" strategy involving lower entry prices and shorter forays into the market than their high reputation/larger rivals. Furthermore, the former entrants induce a much larger price response from low-reputation incumbents, reflecting the more intense rivalry for the price-sensitive consumers willing to eschew retailer reputations.