Reducing Systemic Risk in Financial Networks Through Donations.

We examine the extent to which rescue strategies within a banking system can reduce systemic risk. We focus on donations from solvent banks to banks in distress, which can in principle reduce losses and prevent default cascades. We build an agent-based model to simulate the ensuing strategic game on a randomly generated financial network, where nodes represent banks and edges represent interbank liabilities. Each bank independently decides whether to rescue (and whom) to maximise their payoffs. We analyse the rescue strategies adopted by the banks at equilibrium, using empirical game-theoretic analysis. Our results show that donations can indeed reduce systemic risk when the equilibrium strategy profile is adopted. Individual donations can benefit multiple banks in the network. Our results also indicate that lower default costs and small-variance liabilities tend to decrease the incentives to donate. We furthermore examine the impact of the banks' rationality on the effects of rescue, finding that banks behaving rationally use their funds for rescues more efficiently than banks that behave irrationally.