Host Profit Maximization: Leveraging Performance Incentives and User Flexibility
PROCEEDINGS OF THE VLDB ENDOWMENT(2023)
摘要
The social network host has knowledge of the network structure and user characteristics and can earn a profit by providing merchants with viral marketing campaigns. We investigate the problem of host profit maximization by leveraging performance incentives and user flexibility. To incentivize the host's performance, we propose setting a desired influence threshold that would allow the host to receive full payment, with the possibility of a small bonus for exceeding the threshold. Unlike existing works that assume a user's choice is frozen once they are activated, we introduce the Dynamic State Switching model to capture "comparative shopping" behavior from an economic perspective, in which users have the flexibilities to change their minds about which product to adopt based on the accumulated influence and propaganda strength of each product. In addition, the incentivized cost of a user serving as an influence source is treated as a negative part of the host's profit. The host profit maximization problem is NP-hard, submodular, and non-monotone. To address this challenge, we propose an efficient greedy algorithm and devise a scalable version with an approximation guarantee to select the seed sets. As a side contribution, we develop two seed allocation algorithms to balance the distribution of adoptions among merchants with small profit sacrifice. Through extensive experiments on four real-world social networks, we demonstrate that our methods are effective and scalable.
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