A Multi-Stage Game Model For The False Data Injection Attack Against Power Systems

With the great development of the information communication technology (ICT), the power system has been a typical Grid Cyber Physical System (GCPS). Owing to the vulnerability of GCPS, cyber-attacks on the critical infrastructure can lead to disastrous secure incidents and economic losses. In this paper, a game-theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the detailed multi-stage dynamic attack-defense process to protect the critical measurements. First, the vulnerability of GCPS is researched and briefly summarized. Then a False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) game model is proposed by considering the dynamic interaction between attackers and defenders, where the optimal load shedding is used to quantify the losses. The Nash equilibrium results of the game model on the IEEE 9-bus system in both one-stage and multi-stage process are solved and contrasted, showing the different strategies resulted from various spatiotemporal characteristics of the FDIA process.