When is Trust Robust?
arxiv(2024)
摘要
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can
trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who always
cheat, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function
of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits
multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines,
the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations
or infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes
impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. The resilience
of trust may thus hinge upon the prevalence of scoundrels.
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