Hammurabi

James Larisch,Waqar Aqeel, Michael Lum,Yaelle Goldschlag, Leah Kannan, Kasra Torshizi, Yujie Wang, Tae-Sun Chung,Dave Levin,Bruce M. Maggs,Alan Mislove,Bryan Parno,Christo Wilson

Proceedings of the 2022 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security(2022)

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摘要
This paper proposes using a logic programming language to disentangle X.509 certificate validation policy from mechanism. Expressing validation policies in a logic programming language provides multiple benefits. First, policy and mechanism can be more independently written, augmented, and analyzed compared to the current practice of interweaving them within a C or C++ implementation. Once written, these policies can be easily shared and modified for use in different TLS clients. Further, logic programming allows us to determine when clients differ in their policies and use the power of imputation to automatically generate interesting certificates, e.g., a certificate that will be accepted by one browser but not by another.
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