On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
Games and Economic Behavior(2023)
摘要
We introduce a new approach to studying the existence of a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in an n-player single-prize contest model that covers both perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests. The contestants have continua of possible types and bids, atomless type distributions, and their valuations and costs might depend not only on their own bids and types but also on other bidders' bids and types. Many, quite different contests are covered by our generalized contest model and equilibrium existence in monotone pure strategies in them follows from this paper's results.
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关键词
C65,C72
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