A Survey of Security Challenges in Automatic Identification System (AIS) Protocol

The world of maritime transport is a significant part of the global economy. Traffic control relies, among other means, on the Automatic Identification System (AIS) device, which reports dynamic and fixed data. Vessels use advanced cyber capabilities to falsify data that the AIS transmits and impersonate an innocent ship while carrying out illegal activity, especially the vessel’s location data, without control. A significant part of the work done to find false AIS reports looks for location reports. Each AIS device uses a transceiver based on SOTDMA (Self-Organized TDMA) and determines its transmission schedule (slot) based on data link traffic history and an awareness of other stations’ possible actions. The SOTDMA protocol was developed in the late 1990s and does not have built-in security features, which leaves communication networks vulnerable to cyber threats such as eavesdropping, tampering with data, unauthorized access, and cyber-attacks. This Protocol is widely used in wireless communication systems where no central authority manages the communication between nodes, dynamically adjusts to changes in network topology, and nodes can come and go at any time. This article reviews the cybersecurity challenges in the AIS protocol used in vessels. Most of those challenges imply a variety of areas using SOTDMA protocols like Wireless Sensors (WSNs), Mobile (MANETs), Military, Disaster Relief Networks, Healthcare Monitoring Systems, Industrial Automation Systems, Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) Communication Networks, Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMANs), Internet of Things (IoT) Networks, and Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Communication Networks.