Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies

Green innovation is the inevitable trend in the development of the supply chain, and thus the government adopts subsidy policies for the relevant enterprises to enhance their enthusiasm for green development. In view of the manufacturers' fairness concerns in the dual-channel green supply chain that is composed of manufacturers and retailers, we propose a novel Stackelberg game model led by retailers and analyze the impact of manufacturers' fairness concerns on the decision-making of manufacturers and retailers in the dual-channel green supply chain under government subsidies. The results show that only the wholesale price of products, manufacturers' profits, and retailers' profits are affected by manufacturer's fair concerns. When manufacturer has fair concerns, product greenness and profits of supply chain members rise with the increase in government subsidies. The results can offer an effective reference for the dual-channel supply chain members with fairness concerns to make optimal decisions under government subsidies.