Avenger: Punishing the Cross-Core Last-Level Cache Attacker and Not the Victim by Isolating the Attacker

2022 IEEE International Symposium on Secure and Private Execution Environment Design (SEED)(2022)

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摘要
On a multi-core system, the shared last-level cache(LLC) is vulnerable to various kinds of cross-core contention-based attacks. LLC randomization and LLC partitioning are two promising mitigation strategies that mitigate these attacks. LLC-randomization techniques make an attacker’s life difficult in mounting contention-based attacks but do not entirely mitigate them. Randomized caches are also ineffective in preventing occupancy-based attacks. In contrast, state-of-the-art LLC partitioning techniques mitigate all possible LLC contention-based attacks by allocating isolated LLC regions to different processes or security domains. However, restricting processes to isolated LLC region(s) affects overall LLC utilization and incurs performance overhead (as high as 72%) and memory subsystem energy overhead (as high as 89%); effectively providing security guarantee at the cost of performance and energy.One of the primary reasons for this trend is the fundamental design choice that drives all the state-of-the-art secure LLC partitioning techniques, which isolate all the applications and all the time at the LLC. We revisit this choice and argue that we need to isolate only the attacker process and not all the processes. To isolate the attacker, we propose Avenger, a mitigation technique that uses a state-of-the-art LLC contention attack detector and isolates only the attacker. The detector is flexible and can be trained as per the security requirements of any organization or cloud provider. Experimental results on a 16-core simulated system with one attacker and 15 victims show that Avenger outperforms three state-of-the-art secure LLC partitioning techniques in performance and energy overhead without affecting security. Overall, Avenger provides a robust security guarantee against all contention-based cross-core LLC attacks with 1% average performance overhead in contrast to an average performance overhead of more than 17% with the state-of-the-art secure LLC partitioning techniques.
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关键词
Cache,security,microarchitecture
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