Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collaborative Emergency Response among Government Departments under Accident and Disaster

Different from other fields that introduce sharding algorithm and Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm on the basis of evolutionary game to determine the security and stability of the system, In order to improve the efficiency of the collaborative emergency among government departments in accidents and disasters while avoiding the imbalance of losses and gains among departments, Building an evolutionary game model under the vertical incentive mechanism and analyzing the behavioral decisions and evolutionary paths among departments. The influence of different factors on the evolutionary equilibrium state of the system is investigated by numerical analysis, The results show that the stability of the behavioral strategies of government departments is closely related to the benefits and costs and the vertical incentive policy of both sides of the game, under certain conditions, the larger the vertical incentive, the more government departments tend to respond actively to the accident and disaster, while too small vertical incentive makes government departments tend to choose a negative response strategy.