First Price Auction is 1-1/e² Efficient

2022 IEEE 63rd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)（2023）

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摘要

We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1 - 1/e(2) approximate to 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

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关键词

First price auction,Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,Price of Anarchy

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First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient