C3PO: Large-Scale Study Of Covert Monitoring of C&C Servers via Over-Permissioned Protocol Infiltration
Computer and Communications Security(2021)
摘要
ABSTRACTCurrent techniques to monitor botnets towards disruption or takedown are likely to result in inaccurate data gathered about the botnet or be detected by C&C orchestrators. Seeking a covert and scalable solution, we look to an evolving pattern in modern malware that integrates standardized over-permissioned protocols, exposing privileged access to C&C servers. We implement techniques to detect and exploit these protocols from over-permissioned bots toward covert C&C server monitoring. Our empirical study of 200k malware captured since 2006 revealed 62,202 over-permissioned bots (nearly 1 in 3) and 443,905 C&C monitoring capabilities, with a steady increase of over-permissioned protocol use over the last 15 years. Due to their ubiquity, we conclude that even though over-permissioned protocols allow for C&C server infiltration, the efficiency and ease of use they provide continue to make them prevalent in the malware operational landscape. This paper presents C3PO, a pipeline that enables our study and empowers incident responders to automatically identify over-permissioned protocols, infiltration vectors to spoof bot-to-C&C communication, and C&C monitoring capabilities that guide covert monitoring post infiltration. Our findings suggest the over-permissioned protocol weakness provides a scalable approach to covertly monitor C&C servers, which is a fundamental enabler of botnet disruptions and takedowns.
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关键词
Malware, Botnets, Covert Infiltration, Symbolic Execution
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