False-name-proof mechanism for time window coverage tasks in mobile crowdsensing
2021 International Conference on Computer Communications and Networks (ICCCN)(2021)
摘要
Mobile crowdsensing has been regarded as an efficient paradigm for performing large-scale sensing tasks. In this paper, we consider a specific scenario, where the crowdsensing platform needs to collect the sensing data in a requested time window (RTW), and mobile users would bid for their sensing time windows. This process could be modeled as a reverse auction. In this context, the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism becomes a generic auction mechanism that uniquely guarantees both truthfulness and efficiency, but it is vulnerable to false-name bidding and generates high overpayment for the platform. Thus in this paper, we design the core-selecting mechanism to solve VCG’s vulnerability and improve the revenue. We demonstrate that our proposed mechanism achieves the properties of RTW feasibility, efficiency, individual rationality, and false-name-proofness. Besides, to minimize the incentives of users to deviate from truthful-telling, we adopt a VCG-nearest payment rule and propose an efficient algorithm called CCG-TWC. Our extensive simulation results show that the core-selecting mechanism could reduce VCG’s overpayment by about 10%.
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关键词
Mobile crowdsensing,Time window,Core-selecting,False-name-proof
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