Partitioning Oracle Attacks

In this paper we introduce partitioning oracles, a new class of decryption error oracles which, conceptually, take a ciphertext as input and output whether the decryption key belongs to some known subset of keys. Partitioning oracles can arise when encryption schemes are not committing with respect to their keys. We detail adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks that exploit partitioning oracles to efficiently recover passwords and de-anonymize anonymous communications. The attacks utilize efficient key multi-collision algorithms - a cryptanalytic goal that we define - against widely used authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) schemes, including AES-GCM, XSalsa20/Poly1305, and ChaCha20/Poly1305. We build a practical partitioning oracle attack that quickly recovers passwords from Shadowsocks proxy servers. We also survey early implementations of the OPAQUE protocol for password-based key exchange, and show how many could be vulnerable to partitioning oracle attacks due to incorrectly using non-committing AEAD. Our results suggest that the community should standardize and make widely available key-committing AEAD to avoid such vulnerabilities.