Scatter-and-Gather Revisited: High-Performance Side-Channel-Resistant AES on GPUs
Proceedings of the 12th Workshop on General Purpose Processing Using GPUs(2019)
摘要
Recent works have shown that there exist microarchitectural timing channels in contemporary GPUs, which make table-based cryptographic algorithms like AES vulnerable to side channel timing attacks. Also, table-based cryptographic algorithms have been known to be vulnerable to prime-and-probe attacks due to their key-dependent footprint in the data cache. Such analysis casts serious concerns on the feasibility of accelerating table-based cryptographic algorithms on GPUs. In this paper, we revisit the scatter-and-gather (SG) approach and make a case for using this approach to implement table-based cryptographic algorithms on GPUs to achieve both high performance and strong resistance to side channel attacks. Our results show that our SG-based AES achieves both high performance and strong resistance against all the known side channel attacks on these different generations of NVIDIA GPUs. We also reveal unexpected findings on a new timing channel in the L1 data cache (D-cache) on NVIDIA Maxwell and Pascal GPUs.
更多查看译文
AI 理解论文
溯源树
样例
生成溯源树,研究论文发展脉络
Chat Paper
正在生成论文摘要