Programming the Demirci-Selçuk Meet-in-the-Middle Attack with Constraints.

Cryptanalysis with SAT/SMT, MILP and CP has increased in popularity among symmetric-key cryptanalysts and designers due to its high degree of automation. So far, this approach covers differential, linear, impossible differential, zero-correlation, and integral cryptanalysis. However, the Demirci-Selcuk meet-in-the-middle ((mathcal {DS})-(mathsf {MITM})) attack is one of the most sophisticated techniques that has not been automated with this approach. By an in-depth study of Derbez and Fouque’s work on (mathcal {DS})-(mathsf {MITM}) analysis with dedicated search algorithms, we identify the crux of the problem and present a method for automatic (mathcal {DS})-(mathsf {MITM}) attack based on general constraint programming, which allows the cryptanalysts to state the problem at a high level without having to say how it should be solved. Our method is not only able to enumerate distinguishers but can also partly automate the key-recovery process. This approach makes the (mathcal {DS})-(mathsf {MITM}) cryptanalysis more straightforward and easier to follow, since the resolution of the problem is delegated to off-the-shelf constraint solvers and therefore decoupled from its formulation. We apply the method to SKINNY, TWINE, and LBlock, and we get the currently known best (mathcal {DS})-(mathsf {MITM}) attacks on these ciphers. Moreover, to demonstrate the usefulness of our tool for the block cipher designers, we exhaustively evaluate the security of (8! = 40320) versions of LBlock instantiated with different words permutations in the F functions. It turns out that the permutation used in the original LBlock is one of the 64 permutations showing the strongest resistance against the (mathcal {DS})-(mathsf {MITM}) attack. The whole process is accomplished on a PC in less than 2 h. The same process is applied to TWINE, and similar results are obtained.