Random Oracles and Non-Uniformity.

We revisit security proofs for various cryptographic primitives in the auxiliary-input random-oracle model (AI -ROM), in which an attacker A can compute arbitrary S bits of leakage about the random oracle 0 before attacking the system and then use additional T oracle queries to 0 during the attack. This model has natural applications in settings where traditional random-oracle proofs are not useful: (a) security against non-uniform attackers; (b) security against preprocessing. We obtain a number of new results about the AI -ROM: - Unruh (CRYPTO'07) introduced the pre -sampling technique, which generically reduces security proofs in the AI -ROM to a much simpler P-bit-fixing random-oracle model (BF -ROM), where the attacker can arbitrarily fix the values of 0 on some P coordinates, but then the remaining coordinates are chosen at random. Unruh's security loss for this transformation is,N/ST/P. We improve this loss to the optimal value 0(STI P), obtaining nearly tight bounds for a variety of indistinguishability applications in the AI -ROM. While the basic pre-sampling technique cannot give tight bounds for unpredictability applications, we introduce a novel "multiplicative version" of pre-sampling, which allows to dramatically reduce the size of P of the pre-sampled set to P = O(ST) and yields nearly tight security bounds for a variety of unpredictability applications in the AI -ROM. Qualitatively, it validates Unruh's "polynomial pre-sampling conjecture" disproved in general by Dodis et al. (EUROCRYPT'17) for the special case of unpredictability applications. Using our techniques, we reprove nearly all AI -ROM bounds obtained by Dodis et al. (using a much more laborious compression technique), but we also apply it to many settings where the compression technique is either inapplicable (e.g., computational reductions) or appears intractable (e.g., Merkle-Damgard hashing). We show that for any salted Merkle-Damghrd hash function with m-bit output there exists a collision-finding circuit of size 0(2m/3) (taking salt as the input), which is significantly below the 2""/2 birthday security conjectured against uniform attackers. We build two compilers to generically extend the security of applications proven in the traditional ROM to the AI -ROM. One compiler simply prepends a public salt to the random oracle, showing that salting generically provably defeats preprocessing. Overall, our results make it much easier to get concrete security bounds in the AI -ROM. These bounds in turn give concrete conjectures about the security of these applications (in the standard model) against nonuniform attackers.