Mutual restraining voting involving multiple conflicting parties

> Scrutinizing current voting systems including existing e-voting techniques, one can discern that there exists a gap between casting secret ballots and tallying & verifying individual votes. This gap is caused by either disconnection between the vote-casting process and the vote-tallying process or opaque transition (e.g., due to encryption) from vote-casting to vote-tallying and damages voter assurance, i.e., any voter can be assured that the vote he/she has cast is verifiably counted in the final tally. We propose a groundbreaking e-voting protocol that fills this gap and provides a fully transparent election. In this fully transparent internet voting system, the transition from vote-casting to vote-tallying is seamless, viewable, verifiable, and privacy-preserving. As a result, individual voters will be able to verify their own votes and are technically and visually assured that their votes are indeed counted in the final tally, the public will be able to verify the accuracy of the count, and political parties will be able to catch fraudulent votes. And all this will be achieved while still retaining what is perhaps the core value of democratic elections' \"the secrecy of any voter's vote. The new protocol is the first fully transparent e-voting protocol which technologically enables open and fair elections and delivers full voter assurance, even for the voters of minor or weak political parties.