Differential Fault Analysis Of Streebog

In August 2012, the Streebog hash function was selected as the new Russian federal hash function standard (GOST R 34.11-2012). In this paper, we present a fault analysis attack on this new hashing standard. In particular, our attack considers the compression function in the secret key setting where both the input chaining value and the message block are unknown. The fault model adopted is the one in which an attacker is assumed to be able to cause a bit-flip at a random byte in the internal state of the underlying cipher of the compression function. We also consider the case where the position of the faulted byte can be chosen by the attacker. In the sequel, we propose a two-stage approach that recovers the two secret inputs of the compression function using an average number of faults that varies between 338-1640, depending on the assumptions of our employed fault model. Moreover, we show that the attack can be extended to the iterated hash function using a feasible pre-computation stage. Finally, we analyze Streebog in different MAC settings and demonstrate how our attack can be used to recover the secret key of HMAC/NMAC-GOST.