On The Logical Structure Of De Finetti'S Notion Of Event
LSE Research Online Documents on Economics(2014)
摘要
This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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关键词
Events,De Finetti's coherence criterion,Informations frames,Choice-based probability
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