A Formal Analysis For Capturing Replay Attacks In Cryptographic Protocols
ASIAN'07: Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security(2007)
摘要
We present a reduction semantics for the LYSA calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.
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关键词
Security Protocol, Replay Attack, Cryptographic Protocol, Protocol Process, Encrypt Message
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