A strategic reputation-based mechanism for mobile ad hoc networks

Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are formed by a set of mobile nodes without relying on a preexisting infrastructure. In MANETs, ad hoc nodes should count on intermediate nodes to relay messages between two distant nodes. However, due to the inherent dynamicity of such networks, secure and reliable packet forwarding is difficult to achieve. Besides, considering the scarcity of nodes' power and computational resources, different nodes might find it economically rational to act selfishly in order to maximize their own welfare during their lifecycle. Therefore, in order to keep the network functional we need a mechanism to enforce nodes' contribution to network operations despite their internal characteristics and willingness. In this paper we propose a reputation-based schema to foster cooperation amongst ad hoc nodes in the packet forwarding game and isolate selfish behaviours within the MANETs. In the proposed approach, each node is equipped with a security mechanism to estimate the credibility of its neighbouring nodes as well as adaptive measures to compute the cooperation and defection payoffs in order to strategically choose the most profitable behaviour toward its partners. Experimental results indicate the efficacy of our approach in identifying selfish nodes and promote the adoption of a strategic behaviour determination mechanism in a dynamic network in which different nodes with conflicting tendencies participate.